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Politics and Social Spending in Latin America  
 
We examine the determinants of social expenditure in an unbalanced pooled time series 
analysis for 18 Latin American countries for the period 1970 to 2000.  This is the first 
such analysis of spending in Latin American countries with a full complement of regime, 
partisanship, state structure, economic, and demographic variables, making our analysis 
comparable to analyses of welfare states in advanced industrial countries.  Democracy 
matters in the long run both for social security and welfare and for health and education 
spending, and – in stark contrast to OECD countries – partisanship does not matter.  
Highly repressive authoritarian regimes retrench spending on health and education, but 
not on social security.   
Expenditures on social security and welfare, health, and education are an essential 
part of what governments do to enhance the quality of life of their citizens and the human 
capital base of their societies.  Social scientists have developed a strong body of theory 
and evidence to understand social expenditures as part and parcel of welfare state 
development.  Most of this theory has been built on the basis of studies of welfare states 
in OECD countries and emphasizes mobilization of social groups and the role of political 
parties and institutions, along with economic and demographic factors, as determinants of 
welfare state formation.  Our central question is to what extent this theory travels to 
different contexts and how it needs to be modified for the study of social expenditures in 
Latin America.   
Our focus on social expenditures in Latin America is governed by the concern 
with building on extant theory and developing mid-range theories of welfare state 
development across regions.  In order to do so, we need to study regions that exhibit 
social policy regimes that can be usefully compared with those in OECD countries.  Only 
in Latin America do we find as early as the 1970s social policy regimes with a long 
history that covered a majority of their populations against social risks and thus deserve 
to be conceptualized as welfare states.  However, we emphasize that there is great 
variation in social policy regimes within Latin America, ranging from Uruguay and 
Argentina, where a large majority of the population remains covered by social security 
schemes and enjoys decent education and health services, to El Salvador and Guatemala, 
where social security schemes and quality education and health care reach less than 40% 
of the population.    
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Similarly, since the OECD welfare state literature emphasizes political variables – 
political parties, political institutions (federalism, corporatism), policy legacies (the 
emergence of stake holders in social policy schemes) – we need to study a region where 
there is variation in these variables and they can be studied over a significant period of 
time.  For parties and subnational levels of government to develop and shape politics, 
democracy is a prerequisite.  In the 20th century, Latin America was the non-OECD 
region with the most extensive experience with democracy, both full and restricted 
democracy.  At the same time, Latin America experienced a variety of non-democratic 
regimes, from highly repressive authoritarianism to populist regimes with authoritarian 
traits.  Thus, Latin America provides us with some comparability to OECD countries, but 
in contrast to the latter, Latin America also provides great variation in regime forms.   
In this article we suggest the following theoretical modifications in theories of 
welfare state development to adapt them to the study of social expenditures in Latin 
America:  First and foremost, we need to incorporate regime form as an independent 
variable.  The countries included in the major studies of OECD welfare states have had 
uninterrupted democratic rule since WWII, whereas the Latin American countries have 
experienced periods of more and less repressive authoritarianism and full or restricted 
democracy.  Clearly, we want to understand whether and how these regime forms shape 
social expenditure patterns.   
Second, we need to take into account that the role of political parties may play out 
differently in different economic and social structures and in the presence of different 
policy legacies.  Parties have been shown to be the key factors shaping the generosity and 
redistributive profile of welfare states in OECD countries.  Latin American parties with 
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the same general value commitments and policy preferences as their OECD counterparts, 
however, may face different constraints, leading to different effects on social expenditure 
patterns.  Of particular importance are differences in the historical strength of democracy, 
civil society, and parties themselves, which in turn shaped differences in the historical 
formation of social security systems and thus the policy legacies in terms of their 
distributional impact and clienteles.  Also, the severity of economic pressures has 
constituted a more important influence on social expenditures than in OECD countries.         
Theory and Hypotheses 
There are only a few studies of the determinants of social expenditures and their 
composition in Latin America that we might build on (Avelino et al. 2005; Brown and 
Hunter 1999, 2004; Kaufman and Segura 2001; Wibbels 2006).  Moreover, they all use a 
lagged dependent variable or first differences for the dependent variable.  This essentially 
means that their analyses are analyses of changes in spending from one year to the next.  
We, in contrast, are interested in the determinants of long-term patterns of social 
expenditures which are indicated by levels of expenditure.  This choice makes our 
analysis comparable to studies of social spending in OECD countries, the vast majority of 
which use levels as well.  Similarly, we are interested in the long-run effects of political 
variables.  We would not expect one year of democracy or of dominance of one political 
tendency or another in the legislature and/or the executive to make a major difference in 
the formation of social policy.  We have shown elsewhere that an extrapolation of short-
term effects to the long-term greatly underestimates the impact of political party 
dominance on expenditure patterns in OECD countries (Huber and Stephens 2001: 77).  
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What matters for the achievement of different levels of social expenditures is the 
cumulative record of democracy and strength of different political forces.   
Our theoretical point of departure is the insight of the welfare states literature that 
political power distributions and institutions have profoundly shaped the generosity and 
structure of welfare states in OECD countries.  Arguably the most fundamental set of 
institutions shaping access to and the exercise of political power is regime form.  Access 
to power is broader and more competitive under democratic than under authoritarian 
regimes, and the exercise of power is more accountable under the former than under the 
latter.  Accordingly, we would expect democracies to be more likely to produce policies 
that benefit broad sectors of the population than authoritarian regimes.  Specifically, we 
expect a positive effect of democracy on social security and welfare expenditures, as well 
as on health and education expenditures.   
The question of the impact of regime forms on social policy is not confined to the 
comparison between democratic and non-democratic regimes.  Not all non-democratic 
regimes have the same goals and use the same strategies and tactics.  In post-WWII Latin 
America, non-democratic regimes ranged from reformist and minimally repressive (e.g. 
Perón in his second term, the Peruvian military government under Velasco) to reactionary 
and highly repressive regimes (the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of the Southern 
cone, e.g. Chile under Pinochet, and the military regimes and dictatorships in Central 
America).  While the former regimes tolerated and at times encouraged popular 
organization and protected or even increased social spending levels, the latter used 
repression to weaken popular forces and their capacity to challenge the existing socio-
economic order and make claims on the state.  They let real wages deteriorate and 
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reduced the resources devoted to satisfying popular claims.  Accordingly, we would 
expect a negative effect of highly repressive authoritarian regimes on social expenditures.  
When repressive authoritarian regimes are replaced by democratic regimes, the latter face 
spending levels depressed far below what is acceptable to the voters.  Therefore, we 
expect a legacy of repressive authoritarianism that will fade over time. 
Democracy is also a precondition for the emergence of strong parties and pressure 
groups capable of shaping public policy.  Only prolonged democratic rule makes it 
possible for parties to consolidate as organizations and establish connections to civil 
society.  This is particularly true for parties representing the interests of the 
underprivileged; that is, parties of the left.  Authoritarian regimes may create parties to 
provide support for the regime, but in Latin America most authoritarian regimes actively 
suppressed the left.  Democracy also allows for the strengthening of a variety of groups in 
civil society that represent lower class interests and may attempt to influence policy. 
From the OECD welfare state literature we know that the strength of party blocs 
with different worldviews, value commitments, and constituencies is crucial for the 
amount and structure of social expenditures.  Long-term incumbency of left-wing parties 
results in generous, highly inclusive and redistributive welfare states, with extensive 
public provision of free or subsidized social services.  Long-term incumbency of secular 
right and center parties results in residual, non-generous welfare states, with heavy 
reliance on means testing and scanty financing and provision of social services.  Long-
term incumbency of Christian democratic parties results in generous welfare states, but 
with a less inclusive and redistributive profile, and with heavy reliance on private 
provision of publicly financed or mandated services (Bradley et al. 2003; Castles 1982; 
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Hicks and Mishra 1993; Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993; Huber and Stephens 2001; 
Swank 1992).   
The strong effects of long-term party incumbency stem from the pursuit of 
policies motivated by different commitments to fundamental values and core 
constituencies.  Both experts and politicians place parties on a left-right continuum 
defined primarily by their views of the socio-economic order (Castles and Mair 1984; 
Coppedge 1997; Alcántara and Freidenberg 2001).  Parties compete on other issues, of 
course, such as urban versus rural, ethnicity and  religion, or authoritarianism versus 
democracy, but these other cleavage structures vary considerably across countries 
whereas the left-right division is present everywhere in West European (Lijphart 1981) 
and Latin American (Alcántara and Rivas 2006) party systems.     
Parties of the left are committed to the values of equality and solidarity, or in 
operational terms to using the state to reduce inequality by intervening in the economy 
and providing redistributive transfers and social services.  Parties of the right come in two 
varieties – traditional and liberal.  Both kinds are committed to the value of hierarchy, but 
the traditional conservatives accept paternalism and the use of the state to preserve the 
economic and social order, whereas the liberals espouse individualism and freedom from 
state interference in the economy.  In operational terms, both kinds of conservatives use 
the state to protect economic winners by keeping direct taxation low and providing few 
transfers and social services, or giving them a non-redistributive profile.  Christian 
democratic parties are committed to an organic world view, where the community has a 
responsibility to provide for all of its members, working on the subsidiarity principle 
which holds that the state only steps in where the family and the community are unable to 
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provide (van Kersbergen 1995).  However, they vary greatly in their commitments to 
equality, particularly in Latin America (Mainwaring and Scully 2003).     
Of course, parties have other value commitments that are relevant for social 
policy, particularly for health and education policy, such as progress, development, and 
nationalism, but the commitments to progress and development are shared across the 
party spectrum to a greater extent than commitments to equality and solidarity.  
Therefore, to the extent that these other commitments influence social expenditure 
policies, we would expect them to work in the same direction of increasing expenditures 
on health and education and thus to reduce inter-party differences.  The most relevant 
difference between parties with respect to social policy, and in particular its distributive 
profile, is their location on the left-right continuum.  
A brief justification of our focus on political parties is in order, given that some 
scholars have argued that parties in Latin America are comparatively weak, have little 
programmatic cohesion and only shallow roots in civil society, and relate to their base 
largely through clientelism (e.g. Ameringer 1992, Ames 1995, Mainwaring and Torcal 
2006).  First, social science is cumulative and we want to understand the kinds of effects 
parties have on the same kinds of policies under different structural and historical 
conditions.  Second, other scholars have demonstrated that at least by the end of the 20th 
century some parties in some Latin American countries clearly mattered.  Luna and 
Zechmeister (2005) have shown on the basis of elite and mass survey evidence that there 
is meaningful variation across countries in their sample of the extent to which parties 
cohere programmatically and represent the voters’ policy preferences. Moreover, 
Colomer and Escatel (2004) demonstrate on the basis of data from Latinobarometer 
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surveys from 1995 to 2002, for 17 Latin American countries, that an average of 78% of 
citizens are able to place themselves on a left-right scale.  Finally, scholars have 
demonstrated the impact of partisan preferences on policy formation in Latin America.  
Gibson (1997) traces the connection between policy and electoral coalitions in the 
shaping of market reforms, and Murillo (2001) discusses the behavior of labor unions and 
partisan coalitions in such reforms. 
The ability of parties with different positions on the left-right scale to shape 
policy in accordance with their underlying and enduring value commitments in the post-
WW II period has to be understood within the context of economic development 
strategies, the structure of the labor market, and policy legacies.  The roots of the Latin 
American social security systems are in the Bismarckian occupationally based model, 
later disseminated through the International Labor Office (ILO).  Social security schemes 
were first established for privileged groups (military, police, judiciary, civil servants) and 
later extended to crucial white collar (teachers, bank employees) and blue collar (miners, 
railroad workers, port workers) categories, and finally to formal sector employees in 
general.  In the pioneer countries, this process began in the 1920s and accelerated in the 
1940s and 1950s, linked to import substitution industrialization (ISI).  A second group of 
countries followed suit some two decades later, and in the least developed countries 
coverage of social security schemes remained highly limited (Mesa-Lago 1978; 1989: 3-
6).    
The main political constellations under which social security schemes were 
expanded beyond privileged groups consisted of democratic regimes under left-leaning 
parties with autonomous labor movements (factions of the Colorados in Uruguay; PLN in 
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Costa Rica), or regimes with close ties to organized labor, democratic (the Popular Front 
and the Unidad Popular in Chile), semi-democratic (Perón in Argentina), or authoritarian 
(Vargas in Brazil, PRI in Mexico).  The degree of fragmentation and inequality of the 
social security schemes varied, but all systems had privileged schemes for the military 
and various categories of civil servants and all of them were overall regressive.   
In this context, the preferences of parties of the left were for gradual expansion of 
the social security system, first to blue collar workers and then to those in the informal 
sector, along with unification and improvement of the benefits in the general system.1  
Parties of the right preferred to protect fragmentation and the benefits in the privileged 
systems, but reducing social security expenditures was not a priority before the debt crisis 
of the 1980s and the opening of the Latin American economies.  As long as ISI was 
pursued, social security schemes for private sector workers were financed mainly by 
employee and employer contributions.  Indeed, in several countries employer 
contributions reached rather high levels, comparable to European levels.  The reason why 
this was politically feasible was that employers, protected by high tariff walls, were able 
to pass these costs on to the consumers.   
The debt crisis of 1982 and the ensuing neoliberal structural adjustment policies 
changed the situation radically.  As protectionist barriers were lowered or removed, 
employers pressed for a lowering of their contributions to social security schemes.  As 
unemployment and informalization spread, employee contributions and coverage 
declined, and the social security systems faced fiscal crises, aggravating the general fiscal 
crises faced by Latin American states.  Thus, reduction of social expenditures in general 
and social security expenditures in particular became a priority for the right.  The Chilean 
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model of pension privatization – heavily promoted by the World Bank – became the 
reform of choice for neoliberals on the right.  It is important to keep in mind, though, that 
the transition costs of such reforms were and still are substantial.  Accordingly, even 
radical changes in the social security systems did not translate into a radical lowering of 
expenditures in the short run.  
The left rejected privatization and preferred reforms aimed at the construction of 
unified public systems with strong basic benefits.  Moreover, as the loss of formal sector 
employment left an increasing proportion of the population without social security 
coverage and as poverty levels rose, expansion of non-contributory social benefits 
assumed growing priority for the left.  However, left and right were extremely 
constrained in finding resources for social policy.  Thus, the actual policy differences 
between left and right concerned the allocation of social security expenditures more so 
than their magnitude, and we adopt a non-directional hypothesis for the impact of 
partisan political strength in the legislature on the overall amount of social security and 
welfare spending.   
The reality of social security spending in Latin America at the beginning of the 
21st century is that it is still regressive.  The bulk of social security spending goes to 
pensions, and the remainder to a few other kinds of transfers such as family allowances 
and maternity benefits.  Social assistance is grouped with social security and welfare 
spending in our data, but it accounts for less than 20 percent of the total in this category 
only.2  In the great majority of countries social security coverage remains confined to 
formal sector employees, which means that often 20% to 60% of the economically active 
population remained excluded.  De Ferranti et al. (2004: 268-72), in a study for the World 
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Bank, reviewed a range of studies and found that in most countries in Latin America the 
regressive components of social security spending outweigh progressive components.  
Lindert et al. (2005) confirm this assessment on the basis of their analysis of micro-data.  
ECLAC (2002:28) similarly shows that social security spending provides greater benefits 
to middle and upper strata.   
There are a number of cash transfer programs that are grouped under social 
security but are not employment-based and earnings-related and are progressive, such as 
non-contributory pensions and some conditional cash transfers.  They generally are 
highly progressive and have additional beneficial effects insofar as the conditions for 
receipt are school attendance and primary health care visits of children.  The conditional 
cash transfer programs reviewed by Morley and Coady (2003), however, are limited in 
coverage and financing, reaching a maximum of 0.2% of GDP.  Non-contributory, 
means-tested social assistance pensions are still relatively scarce and poorly funded as 
well (Muller 2005).  In the past few years, under the left-wing governments in Brazil, 
Uruguay, and Chile, these programs have been expanded considerably.  They are clearly 
a highly effective means to redistribute income and reduce poverty, but in the period 
covered by our data they still account for a small percentage of social security and 
welfare spending only.  Nevertheless, there is considerable variation in the allocation of 
social security and welfare expenditures between countries, and indeed we have 
demonstrated elsewhere that a left-leaning balance of power in the legislature is 
associated with lower income inequality in Latin American and Caribbean countries 
(Huber, Nielsen, Pribble and Stephens 2006).  If we had a measure for the overall 
distributive impact of social security and welfare expenditures, we would hypothesize a 
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positive effect of a left-leaning partisan balance, but for the overall level of expenditures 
we adopt a non-directional hypothesis.     
The development of health care systems in Latin America is linked to the 
development of social security schemes.  In many cases, health care insurance has 
paralleled social security in the sense that part of employer and employee social security 
contributions have gone to health insurance.  In some cases, care has been provided by 
social security clinics and hospitals, in other cases by private clinics and hospitals under 
contract with the social security system, and in still others by public clinics and hospitals.  
Public health expenditures have sometimes subsidized social security health care and 
always supported public clinics and hospitals and preventive health campaigns, and in 
some countries social security systems have provided health care on a non-contributory 
basis.  In general, in line with the interests of their primary constituencies – blue collar 
workers and the poor in the case of left-of-center parties, and middle and upper income 
groups in the case of right-of-center parties – left parties have favored an improvement of 
the public health care system and right parties have favored private provision and private 
or social security financing.  However, where formal sector employment was high and 
social security financing of health care had been established for some sectors of the work 
force, left-of-center parties supported expansion of employment-based insurance linked 
to private non-profit provision of care to reach virtually universal coverage (as in 
Argentina and Uruguay).    
The educational system in Latin America shows a similar combination of private 
and public provision.  At the primary and secondary level, private school attendance--
heavily in Catholic schools--has been the norm rather than the exception for the middle 
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and upper classes.  At the university level, public universities played a prominent role.  
Catholic universities have a long tradition, but the proliferation of other private 
universities is a fairly recent phenomenon.  Improvements in public education have been 
a consistent program point of the left, whereas the right has supported parents’ choice 
between private and public schools – a choice heavily contingent on income.     
There are regressive components of health and education expenditures, but in 
general the progressive components tend to outweigh the regressive ones (de Ferranti et 
al. 2004: 263-4).  Studies of different programs show that expenditures on tertiary 
education are regressive, whereas basic education and health services provided by the 
public sector for the uninsured and school nutritional programs have a progressive 
incidence (e.g. Scott 2003 for Mexico; Wodon et al. 2003).  ECLAC data for eight 
countries in the region show that the most progressive types of expenditures are spending 
on primary and secondary education, and that public spending on health care and 
nutrition is the second most progressive category (2002: 26).  Lindert et al. (2005) 
conclude that the bulk of education spending has a generally progressive profile and 
health spending has a slightly progressive or neutral profile.  Thus, on balance, we expect 
a positive effect of left-leaning dominance in the legislature on health and education 
expenditures.          
Federalism has been held responsible in OECD countries for slowing the 
expansion of the public sector in general and the welfare state in particular (Schmidt 
1997; Castles 1999; Obinger, Leibfried, and Castles 2005).  Federalism and other 
institutional arrangements that provide veto points provide the opportunity for opponents 
of legislation to mobilize attempts to block its passage and thus make the adoption – but 
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also the curtailment – of important social policy schemes more difficult (Bonoli and 
Mach 2000; Hicks 1999; Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993; Huber and Stephens 2001; 
Maioni 1998; Swank 2002).    
In general, federalism is likely to have a stronger impact on expenditure patterns 
under democratic rule, when constitutional provisions are followed.  It has the strongest 
potential to serve as a brake on expansion or retrenchment of social spending if the 
representatives of subnational units have a share of formal and real decision-making 
power.  However, it is theoretically possible that subnational powerholders under 
authoritarian regimes may have bargaining leverage with the central government and use 
that leverage to extract more resources from the center for social expenditures.  This 
would be particularly likely to occur under relatively open, non-repressive authoritarian 
regimes, or authoritarian regimes that allow for some kinds of elections.  Accordingly, we 
investigate the impact of federalism regardless of regime type, as well as the impact of 
federalism under democracy only.  Since our period of analysis, 1970 to 2000, includes 
both phases when expansion and retrenchment were on the agenda (though more of the 
latter), the positive and negative effects could counterbalance each other and statistically 
this may result in no significant effects.   
Our control variables include economic and demographic factors that affect both 
the needs for social expenditures and governmental capacity to meet those needs.  We 
expect a positive effect of GDP per capita, urbanization, and the proportion of the elderly 
population on social security spending in Latin American countries. We also expect a 
positive effect of GDP per capita, urbanization, and size of the school age population on 
health and education spending.  Given the contradictory nature of findings in previous 
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studies, we adopt a non-directional hypothesis for the effect of trade openness on both 
types of spending.  We expect a negative effect of FDI on social security spending and a 
positive one on health and education spending because of the importance of human 
capital for employers needing to be competitive in the world economy.  Fiscal deficits 
sooner or later call for austerity policies and we would expect them to have negative 
effects on both social security/ welfare and health/ education expenditures.  We would 
also expect presence of an IMF agreement to be associated with lower levels of both 
social security/ welfare and health/ education expenditures.  
If one considers trajectories of macroeconomic and fiscal management in Latin 
America over the last three decades of the 20th century, it is clear that they went through 
three clearly distinct phases.  The 1970s were a period of slowed growth but continued 
expansion of budgets based on easy borrowing on international markets.  The 1980s were 
the period of the debt crisis, economic contraction, budgetary austerity, and reverse 
capital flows from Latin America to the creditor countries.  In the early 1990s the 
budgetary constraints eased as capital began to flow back to Latin America and economic 
growth resumed.  Starting in the mid-1990s a number of financial crises had regional 
ripple effects and slowed growth again.  These trends affected all the countries in the 
region, though with somewhat different timing and to different degrees.  Therefore, if we 
take the 1970s as a baseline, we would expect a negative period effect for 1982-1989 (the 
first and last years for which the average growth rates in the region were negative) on 
levels of social spending.  The expectations for the 1990s are more ambiguous; the 1990s 
were clearly an expansionary phase, but there was a lot of ground to make up and it is not 
clear whether most countries surpassed the levels of social expenditures of the 1970s. 
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Measures of the Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Our measures of social spending as a percentage of GDP are derived from several 
sources (see Table 1).  The measure of social security and welfare is from the IMF.  The 
measure of health and education spending combines data from ECLAC, Cominetti 
(1996), ECLAC’s Social Panorama, and the IMF.  The construction of the health and 
education series and the methodology for dealing with the varied sources are explained in 
the appendix available at our web site (http://www.unc.edu/~jdsteph/index.html).  Our 
detailed analysis of the sources showed that the Cominetti health and education series 
was significantly higher than the others, so a dummy variable for that data source is 
included in the analysis of health and education spending.  
Our measure of democracy is based upon the classification of regime types in 
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), updated according to those coding rules.  Colonies and all 
kinds of authoritarian regimes are coded as 0, restricted democracies as .5, and full 
democracies as 1.  The measure cumulates the annual series since 1945, to capture the 
strength of the democratic record in the post-WW II period. 3    
We coded repressive authoritarian regime as a separate category, using 1 for every year 
where the country had a repressive authoritarian regime and 0 for every year without such a 
regime; authoritarian regimes were coded as repressive if they committed or tolerated 
widespread human rights violations.  Yearly scores were cumulated over the 5 years prior to the 
year of observation. We reason that the effects of authoritarian rule would fade through time.4  
(See Appendix Table 1 at http://www.unc.edu/~jdsteph/index.html for regime classifications.)   
Our political variables are derived from Coppedge (1997). In his project, he 
consulted country experts to classify political parties which contested elections for the 
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lower house or constituent assemblies in 11 countries of Latin America from as far back 
as 1912.5 His classification scheme contains two primary dimensions and several residual 
categories. First, it includes a left-right dimension, defined primarily in social and 
economic terms. He is concerned with a political party’s ideology and class appeals and 
with its relative prioritization of growth and redistribution. This dimension is divided into 
five categories: left, center-left, center, center-right, and right. Second, it includes a 
religious dimension of two categories, Christian and secular. It distinguishes those parties 
which do and do not base their ideology or programs in the Catholic Church, the Bible, or 
religious philosophy or seek to defend the interests of the Catholic Church and to reduce 
the separation of church and state. Finally, his classification scheme contains three 
residual categories: personalist, other, and unknown. For our purposes, it is sufficient to 
say that these residual categories all contain parties that are not classifiable according to 
left-right or Christian-secular criteria. 
In two respects, we rather directly adopted his work. First, we adopted his 
classification scheme.6 Second, in all but one case, we adopted his classification of 
parties for the country-years that fall within our sample. We make one revision: 
Coppedge classified the Peronists of Argentina as “other,” while we classify them as 
secular center-left during the democratic episodes between 1945 and 1973; as secular 
center during the democratic years from 1974 to 1989; and as secular center-right from 
1990 onward.7
We use his classification scheme to expand the coverage to the full range of 
countries and years that fall within our analysis.8 After classifying each party, we 
summed the proportion of the seats held by each category for each country-year.9 This 
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results in 13 annual series (secular left, secular center-left, secular center, secular center-
right, secular right, Christian left, Christian center-left, Christian center, Christian center-
right, Christian right, Personalist, Other, Unknown) for each country. Each series 
indicates the seat share in the lower house or constituent assembly held by secular left 
parties, secular center-left parties, etc. During years which are non-democratic, as defined 
by our democracy variable, all categories are scored as zero. In our analyses not only of 
social spending but also of inequality and poverty (Huber, Nielsen, Pribble and Stephens 
2006; Huber, Pribble and Stephens 2006), we found that the religious dimension was not 
related to any of the dependent variables.  Thus, we combined the religious and secular 
categories.  Following Cusack and Fuchs (2002), we then calculated legislative partisan 
balance of power (or simply legislative partisan balance) by weighting the seat share in a 
given year of each category of parties by -1 for right, - 0.5 for center-right, 0 for center, 
0.5 for center-left, and 1 for left parties.  For example in Costa Rica in 1971, the center 
right proportion of legislative seats was .386, the center left .579 and the left was .035.  
The legislative partisan balance was (.386*-.5)+(.579*.5)+(.035*1)=.132.  Finally, we 
cumulated the weighted value within each series from 1945 to the year of observation.  
We created a cumulated measure of executive partisan balance in the same way, based 
on which party controlled the presidency. 
We measure federalism with a dichotomous variable.  Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, 
and Venezuela were classified as federal, and the rest of the countries were classified as 
not federal.  To test whether federalism only affected spending during periods of 
democracy, we created an interaction term in which the four federal countries were coded 
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as 1 in years in which they were restricted or full democracies and all other observations 
were coded as zero. 
Five variables comprise our measures of globalization. Trade openness is 
measured as exports and imports as a percentage of gross domestic product. Foreign 
direct investment measures net inflows of investment as a percentage of gross domestic 
product. We measure a central government’s deficit by subtracting total expenditures 
from total revenues, as a percentage of gross domestic product. Finally, we use a 
dichotomy to measure whether or not a country has repurchase obligations to the IMF in 
a given year. To derive our independent variable for IMF influence, we then cumulate the 
dichotomy from 1970.  We also included Morley et al.’s (1999) index of capital account 
liberalization, but it is only available for 362 of our 510 country years.  
We employ three additional economic and demographic controls. First, we use 
real gross domestic product per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parities. Second, 
we include the percentage of the population which is 65 and older for the model 
predicting social security and welfare spending, and the percentage of the population 
which is under 15 years of age for the model predicting spending on health and 
education. Finally, we include an urbanization variable, which measures the percentage 
of the population that lives in areas defined as urban. 
Analytic Techniques 
We use an unbalanced panel data set with 446 observations from 18 Latin 
American countries.  Table 2 lists the countries and the means of the dependent variables 
and the number of observations for each country.  The data span the period 1970 to 2000.  
With few exceptions, the observations are annual.  Hicks (1994) notes that "errors for 
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regression equations estimated from pooled data using OLS [ordinary least squares 
regression] procedures tend to be (1) temporally autoregressive, (2) cross-sectionally 
heteroskedastic, and (3) cross-sectionally correlated as well as (4) conceal unit and period 
effects  and (5) reflect some causal heterogeneity across space, time, or both" (p.172).  
We follow Beck and Katz's (1995) recommended procedure, using panel-corrected 
standard errors, corrections for first-order auto-regression, and imposition of a common 
rho for all cross-sections.  This procedure is implemented in version 8.0 of the Stata 
econometrics program.  Since there is some trend in our data, we do not include a lagged 
dependent variable as recommended by Beck and Katz (1996) because in this situation 
the lagged dependent variable inappropriately suppresses the power of other independent 
variables, as Achen (2000) has shown.10  Beck and Katz (2004:16-17) have shown that 
correcting for first order auto-regression actually does include a lagged dependent 
variable on the right hand side of the equation. Thus, it does deal with the problem of 
serial correlation but without, as our results show, suppressing the power of other 
independent variables.   
Beck and Katz (1996) and others have argued for the inclusion of country 
dummies in order to deal with omitted variable bias.  Plümper et al. (2005: 330-34) in 
their recent treatment of this issue have countered that inclusion of country dummies does 
much more than eliminate omitted variable bias.  It also (1) eliminates any variation in 
the dependent variable which is due to time invariant factors such as difference in 
constitutional structures, (2) greatly reduces the coefficients of factors that vary mainly 
between countries, (3) eliminates any differences in the dependent variable due to 
differences at t1 in the time series, and (4) “completely absorb(s) differences in the level 
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of the independent variables across the units” (p.331, emphasis in the original).  
Elaborating on this last point, they argue that if one hypothesizes that the level of the 
independent variable has an effect on the level of the dependent variables (e.g. history of 
democracy and level of social expenditures), “a fixed effects specification is not the 
model at hand.  If a theory predicts level effects, one should not include unit dummies.  In 
these cases, allowing for a mild bias resulting from omitted variables is less harmful than 
running a fixed effects specification.” (p. 334).  We do hypothesize (#1 above) effects of 
time invariant factors (federalism), (#3) effects in the levels of our independent variables 
prior to t1 on the level of the dependent variable at t1, and (#4) effects of levels of the 
independent variables on levels of the dependent variable.  In addition, variation in 
several of our independent variables is primarily cross sectional (#2).  Thus, it is clear 
that fixed effects estimation or the inclusion of country dummies is not appropriate in this 
case. 
To check our results for robustness, we reestimated all of the models with OLS 
estimation of the regression coefficients, which provides consistent estimates of the 
regression coefficients, and robust-cluster estimators of the standard errors.  The robust-
cluster variance estimator is a variant of the Huber-White robust estimator that remains 
valid (i.e., provides correct coverage) in the presence of any pattern of correlations 
among errors within units, including serial correlation and correlation due to unit-specific 
components (Rogers 1993).  Thus the robust-cluster standard errors are unaffected by the 
presence of unmeasured stable country-specific factors causing correlation among errors 
of observations for the same country, or for that matter any other form of within-unit 
error correlation. The robust-cluster estimator requires errors to be uncorrelated between 
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clusters.  The latter assumption might be violated if unmeasured factors affect the 
dependent variable in all units at the same point in time.  Global economic fluctuations, 
such as the debt crisis period in Latin America, could produce such contemporaneous 
effects.  To evaluate the potential impact of such unmeasured period specific factors we 
re-estimated the models with indicator variables for the debt crisis (1982-89) and for the 
1990s (1990-2000); the baseline category corresponds to 1970-81.  The robust cluster 
OLS estimations were substantially the same as the Prais Winsten estimations.  We note 
below instances in which the robust cluster estimations indicate that our significant 
results are not robust. 
Since the models in Tables 3 and 4 are GLS regressions, there is no conventional 
R2.  The measure calculated by the Stata program to measure goodness of fits is a GLS 
"pseudo R2".  Given the sensitivity of this statistic to the assumptions made in order to 
calculate them, some analysts consider the OLS R2 to be a better indicator of goodness of 
fit.  We report both R2s.   
Results 
The results of regressions of social security and welfare spending on the 
independent variables are displayed in Table 3.  Model 1 includes the control variables.  
Model 2 adds the political variables.  Model 3 substitutes executive partisan balance for 
legislative partisan balance.  Democracy is the only political variable that is significant 
and correctly signed.  A move from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile on 
democracy (a move of 29.5 years) results in an increase in social security spending of 
1.8% of GDP.  While not very large, this effect is not negligible, given a sample mean of 
3.6% of GDP.  Repressive authoritarianism falls short of significance.  Both executive 
  23 
and legislative partisan balance are negative indicating that right-of-center legislatures 
and governments actually tend to spend more (or cut less) but both coefficients are 
insignificant.11  Federalism and the democracy-federalism interaction term are not 
significant.  The one control variable which is consistently significant, aged population, is 
a very powerful determinant of the level of spending on social security and welfare.  A 
move from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile on the percentage of the aged 
population (a move of 5.5%) results in an increase in social security and welfare spending 
of 6.5% of GDP.  In light of the sample mean of 3.6% of GDP, this is a very large effect.  
Indeed, the zero order correlation between the social security and welfare spending and 
aged percentage of the population is .79. 
The results of regressions of health and education spending on the independent 
variables are displayed in Table 4.  The models contain the same independent variables as 
in Table 3 except that youth population is substituted for aged population.  Democracy 
and repressive authoritarianism are correctly signed and significant.  A move from the 
10th percentile to the 90th percentile on repressive authoritarianism (5 years) results in a 
decrease in health and education spending of 1.3% of GDP; a similar change in 
democracy results in an increase in spending of 2.7% of GDP.  In light of a sample mean 
of 5.6% of GDP, this a substantively large effect.12  Federalism and the democracy 
federalism interaction term are not significant.  Both legislative and executive 
partisanship are incorrectly signed and the latter is significant.  However, it is not 
significant in the robust cluster estimates, indicating that the finding is not robust.   
GDP per capita is consistently significant and correctly signed, but its effect is 
modest:  A move from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile is associated with an 
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increase in health and education spending of 1.4% of GDP.  Government budget deficit is 
also significant and correctly signed.  A move from the 10th to 90th percentile on this 
variable results in a decrease of 0.3% of GDP in health and education spending, a 
surprisingly small effect.13    
In contrast to the results for social security and welfare spending, the debt crisis 
indicator is significant and negative.  All countries experienced pressures to reduce 
expenditures across the board in this period.  However, social security and welfare 
expenditures were more resilient than health and education expenditures.   
Discussion and Conclusions 
Our main findings of theoretical interest are that regime forms are important 
determinants of the amount governments spend on transfers and social services.  
Democracy matters in the long run for both social security and welfare, and health and 
education spending.  These findings suggest that democratic governments of all political 
stripes are more responsive to demands for state provision of social security and welfare, 
and for health and education services than are authoritarian governments.  Highly 
repressive authoritarian regimes keep spending on health and education low.  
Interestingly, they do not have a similar effect on social security and welfare spending.   
Partisanship does not matter for the overall amount of social expenditures.  The 
difference between governments of varying political colors is apparently not in how 
much they spend, but in how they allocate what they spend.  We have qualitative 
evidence that left-of-center parties have favored programs with progressive profiles, such 
as non-contributory and conditional transfer programs and school feeding programs and 
preventive health care (e.g. the Unidad Popular in Chile, the PT in Brazil, the FA in 
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Uruguay), and we know from quantitative studies that a left-leaning balance of power in 
legislatures is associated with lower inequality (Huber, Nielsen, Pribble and Stephens 
2006), which leads us to infer that left governments find it difficult to increase the overall 
amount of social expenditures but are more successful in shaping expenditure patterns.14   
Our data do not allow us consistently to separate out progressive from regressive 
kinds of expenditures.  For the restricted set of observations for which the IMF provided 
figures for social security separately from welfare expenditures (120 observations for 13 
countries, virtually exclusively for the period 1972-82) the results of our analyses showed 
the expected pattern of partisanship.  Democracy remained positive and significant for 
both kinds of expenditures.  The legislative partisan balance was negative for the 
combined measure (which is dominated by social security spending) and for social 
security spending alone, and both effects were significant, and it was positive for welfare 
spending, but not significant.   
From many studies done by international organizations (cited above) we know 
that most social security schemes in Latin America at the beginning of the 21st century 
are highly regressive.  Left of center governments were hardly in power long enough 
during the formative years of the social security schemes to shape them into redistributive 
instruments originally.  In the 26 years from 1945 to 1970, our data show only one 
country, Uruguay, where parties of the left and center left together held an average of 
slightly more than 50% of seats (a score of 14, with 13 constituting the 50% mark).  In 
Venezuela and Costa Rica, they averaged about 40%, and in Chile about 30%.15  Once 
the social security schemes were established, they created entitlements, and it became 
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very difficult for left of center governments to reallocate resources from privileged to the 
general social security schemes or from social security to welfare expenditures. 
Unfortunately, there are no conclusive studies of the distributive impact of social 
security schemes as of the late 1970s, before the onset of the debt crisis.  It is safe to 
assume that they were less regressive at that point in time in countries with strong import 
substitution industrialization, particularly Argentina and Uruguay where the formal sector 
was large and unemployment was very low.  In the wake of the debt crisis and structural 
adjustment, the size of the informal sector grew significantly, which made the social 
security schemes more regressive everywhere.  In that situation, left-leaning governments 
were held back by economic constraints in their efforts to increase expenditures to 
improve and expand the general schemes to cover the growing informal sector.   
There is further evidence for the high resilience of social security expenditures.  
Neither the indicator for the debt crisis nor government deficits depressed social security 
expenditures, whereas they both had significant negative effects on health and education 
spending.  The same is true for highly repressive authoritarian regimes; they were 
generally reluctant to make major cuts in social security schemes but not so in health and 
education expenditures.   
Our analysis shows that for social security and welfare spending, demographics 
are crucial.  Once the social security schemes are put into place, they create entitlements 
that are difficult to change, and expenditures grow with the growth of entitled groups.  
The most plausible explanation is the political cost of cutting entitlements, but the legal 
anchoring of social security schemes arguably contributes to their resilience.  Other rights 
are legally anchored as well – prominently among them the right to public education and 
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health care – but they do not carry the same quality of personal entitlement.  Moreover, 
declines in quality of education and health services are not experienced as immediately 
and starkly as declines in social security benefits.  Since social security schemes 
primarily benefit the more privileged and more organized groups, cuts would affect the 
more politically articulate and influential.  The examples of Uruguay and Argentina show 
the potential of large-scale pensioner mobilization in defense of their entitlements very 
clearly.   
 Spending on health and education is more susceptible to economic and political 
constraints and opportunities than spending on social security.  Again, a long record of 
democracy drives up health and education spending, and the effect is stronger than for 
social security and welfare spending.  Since we know that significant sectors of the 
middle and upper classes have opted out of the public systems and that on average overall 
patterns of health and education spending were slightly progressive by the late 1990s, we 
can attribute the relationship between democracy and spending to the opportunities that 
democracy opens for the self-organization of the underprivileged and their capacity to 
push for better health and education services.  Highly repressive authoritarian regimes 
generally crush lower class organizations and thus their ability to push for expansion or 
resist curtailments of health and education services.  The fact that highly repressive 
regimes keep spending on health and education low but not on social security can in part 
be explained by these regimes’ predisposition to target physical, legal, and economic 
repression at the lower classes and blue-collar unions, the main users of public health and 
education services, and their reluctance to take on middle and upper middle classes, the 
disproportionate beneficiaries of social security schemes.  In part it can also be explained 
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by the probability of a stronger reaction across the board against cuts in social security 
than against declines in the quality of health and education services, and the possibility of 
a broad opposition coalition formation. 
The stronger impact of economic factors on health and education spending than 
on social security and welfare spending is underlined by the positive effect of GDP per 
capita on the former and the lack of such an effect on the latter.  The fact that more 
affluent countries devote a greater share of resources to health and education may mean 
that greater availability of resources facilitates devoting a greater share to these purposes, 
or it may mean that countries with better supported health and education systems have a 
stronger human capital base and thus are more successful economically.  Budget deficits 
and the debt crisis also had a constraining effect on health and education expenditures, in 
contrast to their effect on social security expenditures.   
As noted, the previous studies of social expenditure in Latin America are not 
really comparable to ours, because they are studies of change and not levels of 
expenditures and only Kaufman and Segura (2001) include a measure of political power 
distributions, the political orientation of presidents.  However, their study is frequently 
cited, which calls for a brief discussion.  There are three differences between Kaufman 
and Segura’s and our own coding.  They coded political orientation of presidents 
regardless of whether the president was democratically elected or not,16 and we coded the 
political orientation of parties represented in parliament, as well as of presidents, only 
during democratic periods.  Second, they used a dichotomous coding of popularly 
oriented/ popularly based or not, whereas we used a left/ center/ right coding, as 
explained above.  Third, they coded the orientation on the basis of the founding coalition 
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or constituency of the party and continued to code parties the same way for their whole 
history, whereas we followed the conventional coding in OECD studies and Coppedge’s 
coding that allow for changes in classification on the left-right scale if parties change 
their basic orientation towards their original constituency and priorities of growth and 
redistribution. 
Kaufman and Segura find that change towards populist presidents (but not 
incumbency the year before) is positively associated with change in social security and 
welfare spending and negatively associated with change in health and education 
spending.  They interpret this as attempts by populist presidents to protect pension 
spending at the expense of investment in human capital (2001: 580).  This interpretation 
is compatible with our interpretation that health and education spending is more 
vulnerable than social security and welfare spending.  They further find that both 
democracy the year before the observation and change towards democracy is negatively 
associated with change in spending on social security and welfare, and democracy the 
year before is positively associated with change in spending on health and education as a 
percentage of GDP.  The latter finding is compatible with ours.       
Our results contrast starkly with those of studies of welfare states in OECD 
countries, where partisanship has figured prominently.  In addition to the structural and 
historical differences to which we will return momentarily, we can point to differences in 
the time periods covered by these studies to help explain this contrast.  Studies of OECD 
countries typically include the Golden Age of post-war capitalism, the period between 
World War II and the first oil shocks, along with the period of slowed growth, 
globalization, and fiscal pressures on the welfare state beginning in the 1980s.  There is 
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some disagreement over whether partisan effects disappeared in the latter phase or 
whether they persist, but there is agreement that they have weakened under the political 
constraints of entitlements and economic constraints on expenditure increases.  Due to 
data availability, our study of Latin American countries can only cover the period since 
the 1970s, that is, a period of significant fiscal constraints resulting from slowed 
economic growth, the debt crisis of the 1980s and the volatility of the 1990s.  These 
constraints can help to explain the absence of partisan effects.   
The major reasons for the weakness of partisan effects, though, are 
structural and historical in nature.  As noted, parties of the left were generally too 
weak to shape social security systems in their formative period, which in turn can 
be linked to the weakness of the record of democracy itself.  Parties of the 
democratic left and center tended to suffer from prohibition and even persecution 
during many authoritarian periods, as did their support groups in civil society, 
prominently among them labor unions.  Thus, they entered democratic periods as 
relatively weak actors.  A comparison with Western European left of center 
parties, with their close links to civil society organizations and policy think tanks, 
illustrates this weakness well.  As the democratic record gets longer, and if left-
leaning parties along with other democratic institutions manage to consolidate, we 
should expect stronger political effects on social policy also, particularly if the 
region experiences greater economic stability and growth than over the past 25 
years. 
If we keep in mind that a left-leaning partisan balance does depress inequality 
over the longer run, the absence of partisan effects on the level of spending suggests that 
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left-of-center parties have found it difficult to raise new revenue in an economic 
environment where both financial and human capital are highly concentrated, highly 
mobile, and politically influential, and that these parties instead push to change the 
structure of spending to make it more progressive.  They also seek legal and regulatory 
changes to promote the interests of the underprivileged.  In the best of all cases, longer 
records of democracy will be accompanied by a strengthening of political parties, 
particularly those representing the underprivileged and committed to redistributive social 
policy and investment in human capital, which could put in motion a virtuous cycle 
among democracy, human capital, economic development, and human welfare.        
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1  It is important to point out that social security systems have been regressive for three 
reasons.  First, there typically were/are different programs for different categories of 
employees (blue collar, white collar, civil servants) and sectors (e.g. military, judges, 
university professors, bank employees) with different levels of generosity of benefits, 
with the more generous ones being subsidized by general taxes.  Second, within each 
scheme benefits tend to be earnings-related.  Third, social security coverage for the most 
part has been tied to formal sector employment.  Since the main constituencies of left 
parties have been blue collar workers and the poor, or people in the informal sector, left 
parties have promoted reforms to unify programs and equalize benefits, and to include 
people in the informal sector by expanding non-contributory social transfers and health 
care programs.  Good examples of this are the left of center parties in Chile (going back 
to the Unidad Popular), Uruguay, and Costa Rica.   
2 The IMF sources report the two types of expenditures separately for 179 country years 
only; in these observations, social security accounts for 83% of the spending.   
3  We also examined measures developed by Alvarez et al., Freedom House, and 
Mainwaring et al.  Not surprisingly all of these are highly correlated, particularly our 
cumulative versions of the measures.  Alvarez et al. ends in 1990 and Freedom House 
begins in 1972, so these measures do not have sufficient coverage for our purposes.  The 
Mainwaring et al. and Rueschemeyer et al. annual measures are highly correlated (.85) 
and the cumulative versions of the measures are very highly correlated (.95).  Thus, it is 
not surprising that substituting Mainwaring for Rueschemeyer yielded the same results.   
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4 For the three political variables we developed, and experimented with, measures 
cumulated over four periods: 1945 to year of observation, and the 15, 10, and 5 years 
preceding the year of observation.  We selected the measure used in the final analyses for 
theoretical reasons (democratic history expected to have longer term effect) as well as 
empirical ones (better performance in regression models). 
5 For a general defense of the validity of expert surveys in assessing party positions, see 
Steenbergen, Hooghe, and Marks (forthcoming). 
6 See Coppedge (1997) for detailed category descriptions; available at 
http://www.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/criteria.htm.. 
7  Using Coppedge’s coding of the Peronists did not change the results of the analysis.   
8 Unlike Coppedge (1997), we did not use expert surveys. Instead, two members of our 
team independently consulted numerous primary and reference materials in order to code 
each political party. Then, on parties for which there was a disagreement, we did seek 
external expert input, and finally the entire research team convened to make a decision.  
9 Our procedure of tallying seat shares differs from Coppedge (1997), who tallied vote 
shares.  We make this choice on the grounds that seat shares are more consequential for 
policy than vote shares.   
10  In these data, the lagged dependent variable explains 98% of the variation in the 
dependent variable.   
11 Running the models with different time periods for the political variables does not 
change the results.  All periods for partisan balance and repressive authoritarianism 
remain insignificant; the results for democracy for 15 previous years are somewhat 
stronger but for 5 and 10 years are insignificant.  
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12 Running the models with different time periods for the political variables does not 
change the results for repressive authoritarianism, which remains significant but 
somewhat weaker for the longer periods, and partisan balance, which remains 
insignificant.  Democracy, however, falls short of significance for the 10 and 5 year 
periods, but is significant for the 15 year period.  This consistent pattern supports our 
theoretical contention that it is long-term democratic rule that matters for policy.    
13 Regressions with the Morley at el. (1999) capital account liberalization index for both 
dependent variables caused us to lose 148 cases, and the index was not significant, so we 
are not including the models in the tables.   
14  The pattern of social expenditures is not the only factor shaping income distribution, 
of course.  Left governments have also made use of other policies to protect lower 
income groups, such as improvements in labor legislation and the minimum wage.   
15 Keep in mind that parties only receive scores for democratic periods; in non-
democratic periods, we obviously would not expect left parties to influence social policy 
formation.  
16 Thus, their analysis, which begins in 1973, includes the military presidencies of 1973-
75 in Peru and of 1973-79 in Ecuador, and all Mexican presidents since 1973.   
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Social security & welfare spending Social security and welfare spending as a percent of GDP.a
Health & education spending Health and education spending as a percent of GDP.a 
Independent Variables
Methodological controls
Data source indicator Coded 1 if Cominetti (1996) is the source for health and spending data, otherwise coded 0.a +/- +/-
Debt crisis 1982-1989 - -
Recovery 1990-2000 +/- +/-
Logic of industrialism
GDP per capita Per capita GDP in thousands of 1995 purchasing power parity dollars.b + +
Urban population % of population living in areas defined as urban.c + +
Aged population % of population age 65 and older.c +
Youth population % of population age 14 and younger.c +
Globalization
Trade openness Total exports and imports as a percent of GDP.b +/- +/-
Foreign direct investment inflows Net inflows of foreign direct investment as a percent of GDP.c - +
Deficit Government deficit as a percentage of GDP.c - -
IMF Scored 1 for each year a country has repurchase obligations with the IMF and 0 for each year it 
does not, cumulative since 1970.c
- -
Political factors
Democracy Cumulative years of democracy from 1945 to the year of the observation.a + +
Federalism Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela coded as federal.a +/- +/-
Democratic federalism Dichotomous indicators of federal democracies.a +/- +/-
Repressive authoritarianism Years of repressive authoritarianism in the previous 5 years.a - -
Legislative Partisan Balance Cumulative index of ideological center of gravity in the lower house from 1945 to the year of 
the observation (see text).a
+/- +
Executive Partisan Balance Cumulative index of ideological center of gravity in the executive from 1945 to the year of the 
observation (see text).a
+/- +
Table 1.  Variable Descriptions, Data Sources and Hypothesized Effects for Social Spending Levels in Latin America
Hypothesized impact:
Sources: a (author cite); bPenn World Table Version 6.1; cWorld Bank (2003)  
  
 







Argentina 5.5 5.4 30
Bolivia 2.9 6.0 21
Brazil 7.4 4.5 27
Chile 8.7 5.9 29
Colombia 1.8 5.6 11
Costa Rica 3.7 9.5 29
Dominican Republic 0.9 3.5 28
Ecuador 0.2 4.6 18
El Salvador 0.5 3.7 31
Guatemala 0.6 2.6 27
Honduras 0.7 6.0 24
Mexico 2.9 5.5 27
Nicaragua 3.0 5.8 15
Panama 4.5 10.0 21
Paraguay 2.2 2.5 27
Peru 0.9 3.8 23
Uruguay 13.7 5.0 28
Venezuela 1.8 5.4 30
All country years 3.6 5.2 446
10th percentile 0.4 2.4
90th percentile 8.5 9.3
Table 2:  Mean Social Spending as a Percentage of GDP
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Variables
Debt crisis (1982-89) .266 .172 .209
(.227) (.228) (.228)
Recovery (1990-2000) .370 .205 .278
(.332) (.337) (.334)
GDP per capita -.102 -.171 -.162
(.164) (.167) (.170)
Urban population .050 * .033 .032
(.023) (.030) (.032)
Aged population 1.283 * 1.196 * 1.205 *
(.298) (.238) (.255)
Trade openness -.008 -.007 -.008
(.006) (.006) (.006)
FDI .002 -.001 .000
(.021) (.218) (.021)
Deficit -.007 -.011 -.010
(.016) (.016) (.016)
IMF -.025 -.012 -.017
(.036) (.036) (.038)




Democratic federalism .072 .077
(.370) (.373)
Repressive authoritarianism .124 .104
(.139) (.145)
Legislative partisan balance -.090
(.052)
Executive partisan balance -.026
(.037)
Common ρ .91 .88 .89
Constant -4.354 * -3.835 * -3.641 *
(1.269) (1.507) (1.593)
OLS R2 .68 * .73 * .72 *
Prais Winsten R2 .24 * .31 * .29 *
N=446
* p ≤ .05; two-tailed test openness, federalism, democratic federalism, recovery, and partisanship; otherwise one-
tailed test.
Table 3: Prais-Winsten Estimates of Determinants of Social Security and Welfare 
Spending
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Variables
Debt crisis (1982-89) -.406 * -.439 * -.462 *
(.217) (.207) (.206)
Recovery (1990-2000) -.225 -.460 -.497
(.316) (.298) (.294)
Data source indicator .994 * 1.076 * 1.055 *
(.312) (.333) (.329)
GDP per capita .231 * .236 * .200 *
(.109) (.100) (.099)
Urban population -.002 -.019 -.010
(.023) (.023) (.023)
Youth population .032 .101 .122 *
(.066) (.067) (.068)
Trade openness .002 .006 .003
(.006) (.006) (.006)
FDI -.250 -.024 -.024
(.028) (.031) (.030)
Deficit -.041 * -.039 * -.040 *
(.015) (.015) (.015)
IMF .147 ^ .121 ^ .135 ^
(.035) (.030) (.032)




Democratic federalism .549 .593
(.356) (.356)
Repressive authoritarianism -.259 * -.226 *
(.077) (.080)
Legislative partisan balance -.091
(.060)
Executive partisan balance -.106 ^
(.042)
Constant 1.419 -1.131 -2.206
(3.900) (3.973) (3.905)
Common ρ .87 .81 .81
OLS R2 .37 * .52 * .53 *
Prais Winsten R2 .23 * .31 * .32 *
panel corrected standard errors in parenthesis
N=446
* p ≤ .05;  ^ significant but sign of coefficient opposite of directional hypothesis; two-tailed 
test data source, openness and federalism; otherwise one-tailed test.
Table 4: Prais-Winsten Estimates of Determinants of Health and Education Spending
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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